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Abstract 
We review the theory and evidence on liquidity, price discovery and market 
efficiency associated with securities lending and short-selling. We also study the 
efforts by the Hong Kong and Taiwan stock exchanges to develop short-selling. We 
build on this to generate ideas for the development of securities lending and short-
selling in mainland China. We argue that a phased program of reform, well-
implemented, can help build confidence in the mainland Chinese equity markets, by 
aiding price discovery and improving market liquidity. 
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Securities lending and short-selling are of interest to academics, market 
participants and regulators alike, because of their impact on market prices and 
liquidity, and because of their role in the process of arbitrage. The impact of short-
selling on market prices has been the subject of much empirical work. Constraints on 
short-selling have also been examined, theoretically and empirically, in a variety of 
studies. Although short-selling is permitted on many stock exchanges worldwide, 
mainland Chinese exchanges do not explicitly permit the practice. We review the 
literature on securities lending and short selling, and discuss the implications for 
equity markets on mainland China. We argue that it is in the long-term interests of 
the mainland Chinese markets to permit these practices. We study the gradual 
development of short-selling in the Hong Kong and Taiwan markets, and incorporate 
evidence from the literature, to suggest a phased program of reforms in the mainland 
Chinese markets. Transparency and anti-abuse measures are discussed as part of the 
development program. 
The aim of this paper is to explore the effect of securities lending and short-
sale restrictions on the mainland Chinese equity markets, and to observe 
liberalization efforts in other markets. We conduct a documentary analysis of the 
literature on short-sale constraints and their impact on markets, and make pragmatic 
arguments for their application to the mainland Chinese equity markets. We identify 
successful elements of reform in other markets, particularly those in Hong Kong and 
Taiwan, and consider their application to mainland Chinese equity markets. 
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Securities lending is the market practice whereby securities are transferred 
temporarily from one party (the lender) to another (the borrower) for a fee. The 
borrower must return the securities to the lender either at the end of an agreed term, 
or on demand. In law, securities lending is an absolute transfer of title (or sale) 
against an undertaking to return equivalent securities. Most securities loans are 
collateralised with cash or other securities. The process is facilitated by 
intermediaries such as custodians, investment banks or stockbrokers. Lending of 
securities is primarily motivated by the fee income received from the loan.  Although 
generally at a thin rate (averaging 25b.p. per annum in the USA, but occasionally 
reaching much higher levels, according to D’Avolio, 2002), lending improves the 
asset’s total performance and can offset custodial fees and administrative expenses. 
Lenders can also be motivated by the desire to borrow short-term money, and can do 
this by arranging transactions such as cash-collateralised securities lending or 
repurchase agreements. Securities lenders include long-term investors such as 
pension funds, insurance companies and mutual funds. Banks and broker-dealers also 
act as securities lenders.  
The most common reason for borrowing, according to Faulkner (2004), is to 
settle an outright sale of securities. This is known as short covering, and is required 
after a short-sale. In the United States securities markets, for example, Regulation 
SHO requires short-sellers to locate stock for borrowing, prior to selling a stock short. 
Other motivations include market makers borrowing securities to fill customer buy 
orders, exchange specialists borrowing to maintain price stability, and stockbrokers 
borrowing to cover a short position after failed settlement. Securities borrowing can 
also be related to hedging by the counterparties to contracts for differences, spread 
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bets and swaps. The temporary transfer of ownership can also motivate securities 
borrowing. This includes dividend capture strategies such as ‘scrip dividend 
arbitrage’ and ‘dividend withholding tax arbitrage’. In this latter case, for example, 
the holder of securities is subject to withholding tax on interest or dividends, but the 
borrower would be free of withholding tax. Some of the benefits the borrower 
obtains from receiving the dividend free of withholding tax are shared with the 
lender. As an illustration, appendices 1 and 2 show the composition of securities 
borrowers and lenders on the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSEC).  
The securities lending process includes negotiation of loan deals, delivery of 
collateral to securities lenders, the investment of cash collateral and the eventual 
return of the borrowed securities. Clearing and settlement services are provided by 
clearing houses acting as central counterparties, central securities depositories and 
providers of cross-border settlement. In view of the narrow margins that users expect, 
securities lending has become a volume business. Agent lenders are generally global 
custodians or specialised agents participating on behalf of a large number of clients. 
Specialized agents invest in the systems needed to conduct securities lending 
operations, and gain economies of scale by pooling the securities of various owners. 
Agents and owners split the revenues arising from securities lending deals. 
Intermediaries undertake a variety of tasks, including: negotiation of loans for 
securities owners, daily mark-to-market calculations to ensure that collateral is 
maintained at minimum required levels, investment of cash collateral, risk and 
compliance monitoring, and performance reporting. 
Short-selling is the sale of securities that the seller does not own, or that the 
seller owns but chooses not to deliver. The short-seller must borrow securities in 
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order to fulfil delivery obligations to the purchaser. ‘Naked short-selling’ occurs 
when the short-seller does not borrow, and so does not deliver, stock to the purchaser. 
Short-selling is particularly associated with the activities of arbitrageurs and hedge 
funds. Although some funds exclusively sell short, seeking to benefit from a decline 
in the value of a security, most short-selling is part of a broader trading strategy, 
designed to exploit perceived pricing anomalies between two or more securities. 
Examples of such trading strategies include capital structure arbitrage (see Yu, 2006), 
merger arbitrage (see Mitchell and Pulvino, 2001) and pairs trading (see Jacobs and 
Levy, 1993). Not all short-sales are driven by expectations of a price change; some 
sales are meant to stabilise prices. For instance, underwriters often sell short to 
reduce volatility in the price of public offering and buyback programs. 
In a theoretical, perfectly efficient market, all available information is 
imputed in security prices. Classical descriptions of arbitrage, such as Fama (1965), 
regard short-selling as an essential mechanism for correcting over-pricing in 
securities. Arbitrage is thus regarded as a process that ensures that securities markets 
are informationally efficient in equilibrium. In practice, however, a number of risks 
and limitations are associated with arbitrage (see for example, Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997, and Jones and Lamont, 2002). Short-selling constraints feature amongst these, 
and range from costs associated with borrowing securities to the outright prohibition 
of short-selling. A fertile area of research in recent years has been the study of the 
impact of short-selling constraints on market prices and returns. In this paper, we 
review the theoretical literature on short-selling constraints in Section 2.1, and 
explore the empirical literature in Section 2.2. In the later parts of  Section 2, we 
discuss the benefits and risks arising from short-selling, alternatives to short-selling, 
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and issues arising for regulators. Section 3 discusses the possible development of 
securities lending on mainland China. Section 4 provides suggestions for developing 
short-selling on mainland China, and we conclude in Section 5. 
 
 
2. Theory and evidence on short-selling 
 
2.1 Theoretical perspectives 
 
Classical asset pricing models such as arbitrage pricing theory (APT) are 
based on the assumption that there are no short-sale constraints in markets. However, 
in practice, impediments to short-selling exist. Miller (1977) theorises that with 
short-sales constraints and divergence of opinion amongst investors, the price of a 
security is set by the beliefs of the most optimistic investors, not by those of the 
average investor. This allows some securities to become overpriced. In his model, 
overpricing develops because pessimists are prevented from short-selling overpriced 
stocks. Miller concludes that “the presence of a substantial number of well informed 
investors will prevent there from being substantially undervalued securities, but there 
may be securities whose price has been bid up to excessive levels by an uninformed 
minority, thus contradicting the efficient market hypothesis.” 
Harrison and Kreps (1978) state that if the markets for stocks were perfect, 
the amount of stock available to be held long would not be fixed, but would 
“increase as members of less optimistic classes sold the stock short”. They conclude 
that “Equilibrium will be reached only when investors take positions sufficiently 
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disparate that their aversion to risk gives them identical marginal beliefs".  Morris 
(1996) argues that the price of a stock can be higher than the valuation of all 
investors due to the opportunity to speculate that arises when shorting is prohibited.  
However, Jarrow (1980) points out that under “homogeneity of beliefs” for 
the covariance matrix of future prices, short-sale constraints will only increase prices 
of risky assets. He points out that according to Miller (1977), market-wide short-sale 
constraints would lead to pervasive overpricing of the entire market. Diamond and 
Verrecchia (1987) explicitly dismiss the possibility of price bias as a result of short-
sale constraints, observing that “rational expectations formation…removes any 
upward bias to prices.” They conclude that in a rational expectations framework, 
short-sale constraints might not lead to overvaluation. Chen, Hong and Stein (2002) 
note: “in spite of its surface plausibility and intuitive appeal, the evidence for 
Miller’s theory remains somewhat sparse, even after 25 years… [perhaps 
because]…empirical efforts in this area have tended to follow Figlewski (1981) who 
tests the theory by looking at the relationship between short interest and subsequent 
returns.”  
With new theories incorporating his insight into more formal and refined 
models, Miller’s assertion has recently won greater appreciation. Duffie, Garleanu 
and Pedersen (2002) claim that a large discrepancy between the beliefs of optimists 
and pessimists, or strong lender bargaining power, can produce share prices above 
even the most optimistic shareholders’ valuation. Danielsen & Sorescu (2001) 
empirically test the implications of a general equilibrium theoretical model derived 
as an extension of Jarrow (1980) and Miller (1987). They assert that high return 
correlation with the broader market leads to a higher probability of short-sale 
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constraints. Hong, Scheinkman, and Xiong (2004) claim that “a speculative bubble 
arises because investors, with heterogeneous beliefs due to overconfidence and 
facing short-sales constraints, anticipate the option to resell the stock to buyers with 
even higher valuations.” Research thus continues to explore the nature of the 
differences between the perfectly efficient markets of classical finance theory, and 
more realistic markets that suffer from short-selling constraints. 
 
2.2 Empirical studies on short-selling 
 
Various studies examine the relationship between short-interest (the 
proportion of shares shorted) in a security, and abnormal return. Figlewski (1981), 
Brent et al. (1990), Figlewski and Webb (1993) and Woolridge and Dickinson (1994) 
find no evidence of a strong relation between short-interest and abnormal return. By 
contrast, Senchack and Starks (1993) investigate the market reaction to monthly 
short-sale announcements from both the New York and the American Stock 
Exchanges. They examine the wealth effects of short-interest announcements, and 
the relation between wealth effects and the degree of unexpected increases in short-
interest. Using monthly common-stock short-interest figures from 1980 to 1986, they 
identify companies showing ‘unusually large’ increases in short interest. They find 
evidence that some significant negative price reaction occurs in an extended period 
around the announcement of a substantial increase in short-interest. 
By focusing on firms with large short-interest only, Asquith and Muelbroek 
(1996) argue that the power of such tests can be improved. They find a strong and 
consistent relation between short-interest and excess returns. Shares with high levels 
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of short interests (greater than 2.5% of shares outstanding) perform significantly 
worse than comparable shares without high levels of short interest. 
Only limited, monthly information on short interest has been publicly 
available in the USA prior to 2005, and this has limited the scope of research into 
this topic. Aitken et al. (1998) analyse information provided by the Australian Stock 
Exchange (ASX), covering intra-day information on short positions in listed ASX 
equities. Short trades were reported to the market soon after execution. Using details 
of all limit and market orders placed, and trades executed on the ASX’s automated 
trading system, they investigate the market reaction to short sales. They study short 
periods of time (up to 45 minutes) after short sales, and also the 30 trades that 
immediately follow the short-sale.  They find a significantly negative abnormal 
return in calendar time following short-sales (both limit orders and market orders). 
Abnormal returns are calculated by comparing short-sales to matched non-short sale 
trades.     
Dechow et al. (2001) examine the extent of short selling during the period 
1976-1993, using public US data. They use as their short interest variable the 
percentage of outstanding shares shorted. From their sample of over 34,000 firm-
years, they show that 36.6% of firm-year observations show no short positions. 
Approximately 46% of observations show small short positions (greater than zero but 
less than 0.5% of outstanding shares). Less than 2% of observations have over 5% of 
outstanding shares shorted. They chart percent of outstanding loans shorted against 
time in calendar years, and suggest that the growth in short selling (from less than 
0.2% of outstanding shares being shorted in 1976 to approximately 1.4% in 1993)  
may be due to deregulation of the capital markets and the growth in hedge funds. The 
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authors also investigate the trading strategies of short-sellers They highlight a strong 
relation between the trading strategies of short sellers and ratios of fundamentals to 
market prices. They show that short sellers target equities that have low fundamental 
to price ratios, and then unwind their positions as these ratios revert to the mean. 
They also show that short sellers refine their trading strategies in three ways: by 
avoiding equities where short-selling is expensive; by using information other than 
fundamental to price ratios that has predictive ability with respect to future returns; 
and by avoiding equities with low fundamental to price ratios where the low ratios 
are due to temporarily low fundamentals (as opposed to temporarily high prices). 
Their evidence suggests that “short sellers are sophisticated investors who play an 
important role in keeping the price of stocks in line with fundamentals.” 
Jones and Lamont (2002) study the centralized stock loan market on the floor 
of the New York Stock Exchange (known as the ‘loan crowd’) from 1926-1933. 
They show that as stocks ‘enter the loan crowd’, they generally have high valuations 
and low subsequent returns. Size-adjusted returns are 1-2% lower for stocks that 
enter the loan crowd for the first time, and despite the high costs of borrowing and 
shorting these securities, it is profitable to short them.  
Angel et al. (2003) study 3 months of short trades reported to NASDAQ 
trough its ACT trade-reporting system (from 13/9/00 to 12/12/00). They assess the 
frequency of short selling for their sample of NASDAQ trades. They find that 2.36% 
of trades are short trades, with the median less than the mean, suggesting that short 
sales tend to be concentrated in certain shares on a subset of days. Based on the 
percentage of shares shorted, they find that 2.88% of shares traded were shorted. The 
median (1.10) was much lower, suggesting a concentration of shorting activity in 
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certain companies. Where the degree of short selling is greater than average, 
significantly negative market-adjusted returns follow in the next three days. Short-
selling is more common in actively traded companies and in shares with higher price 
volatility. Angel et al. (2003) also find that short selling is focused on shares 
exhibiting greater than average price performance, as measured by price performance 
during the three month period under analysis.  
D’Avolio (2002) examines stock lending fees and shows that ‘growth’ and 
‘low-momentum’ stocks are relatively more likely to be ‘special’, leading to practical 
difficulties and costs in creating the long/ short factor portfolios found in the finance 
literature. Geczy et al. (2002) analyse a private database of US securities lending. 
They examine if investors can actually realize the returns of such long-short factor 
portfolios, including the book-to market strategy from DeBondt and Thaler (1987) 
and Fama and French (1993), and the price momentum strategy from Jegadeesh and 
Titman (1993). Geczy et al. find that the expected-return difference between 
unconstrained factor portfolios found in the literature and portfolios that investors 
could actually hold is significantly smaller than the unconstrained factor portfolios’ 
documented profitability. They argue that if short-selling problems explain the 
availability of factor portfolio returns to unskilled managers, then these short selling 
problems are not borrowing costs, but perhaps prohibitions on short-selling, or 
liquidity constraints, as cited in Shleifer and Vishny (1997).  
Bris, et al. (2003) find empirical evidence supporting the hypothesis that 
difficulty in short-selling is associated with security mispricing. They analyze a 
sample of countries where short-selling is permitted, using time-series and cross-
sectional difference techniques, and compare with countries where short-sales are not 
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allowed or not practiced. They construct two measures of price efficiency that 
quantify the asymmetric response of individual stock returns to negative or positive 
information. They find that prices reflect information faster in countries where short-
sales are allowed. This evidence is consistent with more efficient price discovery at 
the individual security level in the absence of short-selling constraints. 
Charoenrook and Daouk (2004) survey the regulation and feasibility of short 
sales and put option trading across a number of stock markets and employ this data to 
analyse the effects of short-sale constraints. They assert that in countries where short 
selling is possible, volatility is lower and liquidity is higher. They also argue that in 
countries where short selling is permitted, markets have “lower cost of capital and 
the stock market price increases when short-sale restrictions are lifted. The authors 
argue that: “These findings appear to support the argument that short-sale constraints 
reduce market quality”. 
In summary, the empirical literature generally finds a negative relationship 
between unexpected or above-average short-selling and abnormal returns at the 
individual stock level. However, short-selling constraints at the country level are 
associated with higher volatility, poorer liquidity and less efficient price discovery at 
the individual stock level. 
 
2.3 Opportunities arising from short-selling 
 
Alexander (1993) argues that, as most stocks have a positive covariance with 
one another, “short-selling creates a set of negative covariances”. This can be used to 
reduce risk when constructing a portfolio.  He suggests that in the context of total 
 14
portfolio risk, short–selling might not be as risky as it seems when merely looking at 
the variance of a short position. The ability to undertake short-selling also allows the 
manager a further means of protecting portfolio value against an anticipated market 
fall. Brent et al. (1990) find evidence supporting arbitrage and hedging motives for 
taking short positions. They find only weak evidence in support of tax-based or 
speculative trading motives. 
Ackermann and Ravenscraft (1998) show that regulatory differences between 
mutual funds and hedge funds lead to large differences in their uses of short-selling, 
as well as leverage, concentration, derivatives illiquid securities and lock-up periods. 
Such differences appear to hinder mutual fund performance relative to hedge fund 
performance. Ackermann et al. (1999) study hedge fund returns in the eight years 
ending 1995. They find higher total risk (as measured by standard deviation of 
monthly returns) in hedge funds compared to US mutual funds. They refer to the 
latitude and flexibility that hedge fund managers have compared to mutual fund 
managers and find that hedge funds achieve higher Sharpe Ratios than mutual funds, 
despite their higher volatility. However, they warn that “some of the characteristics 
that enhance hedge fund performance may not be appropriate for mutual funds that 
attract undiversified, risk-averse clients.” Thus, the major concern with respect to 
risk should not be the stand-alone volatility of returns for a fund, but how it fits into a 
client’s existing portfolio.  
Short-selling allows for more ‘informationally efficient’ portfolios to be 
created (see Clarke et al., 2004). Information gained from investment analysis, 
including negative opinions on stocks, is fully utilised when short-selling is 
permitted. Equities deemed to be over-valued need not merely be zero-weighted in a 
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portfolio (as is traditional in long-only portfolios) but can be short-sold to reflect a 
negative opinion. This is particularly helpful when a negative opinion is obtained on 
a smaller company, as merely holding a zero weighting in a smaller company will 
have little benchmark-relative impact on performance. 
 
2.4 Constraints and risks associated with short-selling 
 
The legal, fiscal, institutional and cultural restrictions, and the various costs 
and risks of short selling, are collectively referred to by financial economists as 
‘short-sale constraints’. These include the direct monetary costs of borrowing shares, 
difficulty in locating securities to borrow and regulatory constraints such as the “up-
tick” rules found in the USA and Japan2.  
Investment risks associated with short-selling include fundamental risk. A 
typical arbitrage position, such as might arise in pairs trading, involves a short 
position in an apparently over-valued security, and a long-position of equal size in a 
similar, less over-valued security. This partially hedged arbitrage position is risky, 
because the fundamental value of the combined position might change over time. 
Furthermore, the valuation models used by the arbitrageur might be faulty.   
 
2 An up-tick rule is imposed by the SEC and the exchanges: Rule 10a-1 under the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934. A short-sale may only occur at a price above the previous transaction price, or else at a 
peice equal to the previous transaction price, so long as the previous transaction in turn was at a higher 
price than the transaction before it. This is commonly used in reference to stocks, but it can be 
extended to commodities and other forms of securities. 
 
 16
Noise trader risk, such as identified by De long et al .(1990), addresses the 
risk that prices can move further away from fundamental value, due to the correlated 
actions of some investors who trade on sentiment, as opposed to fundamental 
analysis or privileged information. If the investor can hold on the position long 
enough, a reversion to fair value will ensue and noise trader risk merely presents 
opportunities to take additional arbitrage positions. But in practice, the investor 
might be unable to hold the position long enough to profit from reversion. Reasons 
for this might include an inability to meet margin calls for collateral on the short sell 
position if noise traders move prices further away from the investors perceived fair 
value, or redemption by clients disaffected with short-term performance, as 
highlighted by Shleifer and Vishny (1997). 
Short sellers must borrow securities to settle short positions. For a security 
borrowed on call rather than on a term loan, the short-seller risks having the 
borrowed security ‘recalled’ by the lender. A ‘short squeeze’ is an orchestrated recall 
at a time of a rising share price, forcing the short-seller to cover his/ her position at 
disadvantageous prices. D’Avolio (2002) highlights that when a ‘special’ (an 
expensive to borrow security) is recalled, short sellers on average are unable to 
renew a similar loan for a mean of 23 days (median of 9 days). 
Synchronization risk, as identified by Abreu and Brunermeier (2002) is 
concerned with uncertainty about the market timing decisions of other rational 
arbitrageurs, and thus the timing of the price correction. They show that rational 
arbitrageurs should not act immediately on knowledge of stock over-valuation, but 
instead wait for other rational arbitrageurs to learn about the over-valuation. Acting 
immediately might lead to losses, if enough other rational arbitrageurs do not know 
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of the over-valuation and fail to act at the same time. Chanos (2003) states “It is very 
costly and full of risk for the short seller to execute and maintain a position, waiting 
for the rest of the market to realise the stock is overvalued.” 
The distribution of returns associated with short selling and arbitrage 
introduces new risks to investors. Ackermann et al. (1999) state that the “standard 
deviation of return measure of total risk may not fully capture the complex risk 
taking from hedge funds’ dynamic, highly leveraged strategies.” For example, the 
distribution of returns from hedge funds typically exhibit ‘fat tails’ relative to a 
Normal or log-normal distribution. Mitchell and Pulvino (2001) state that “Risk 
arbitrage is appropriate only for those investors that are willing to incur negative 
returns in severely depreciating markets and limited positive returns in flat and 
appreciating markets.” As the expected return from owning a risky asset is positive, 
holding a short position in that same risky asset has a negative expected return. 
Furthermore, profits are limited to 100% of the proceeds on the date of sale, but there 
is no pre-defined limit to the extent of losses. In practice, the capital of the short-
seller places a constraint on losses. At the point at which the short-seller runs out of 
capital and is unable to meet variation margin, his/ her short-position will be covered 
by the broker and the short-sellers loss will be crystallized.  
 
2.5 Alternatives to short-selling 
 
Geczy et al. (2002), and Lamont and Thaler (2001) both note that there are 
alternative means of obtaining short exposure to an equity, other than short-selling. 
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Fabozzi (2004) suggests that it is less costly to implement a short-selling strategy in 
the futures market than in the ‘cash’ market. 
Raab and Shwager (1993) show that the existence of an index future allows 
traders to ‘span’ the market – to create a short-sale position in any individual stock 
through a combination of long equity positions and a short index futures position.  
Single stock put options allow investors to gain from falling share prices, and 
can thus provide an alternative to short selling. Because of the lower transaction 
costs associated with single stock put options relative to short selling of shares, the 
introduction of such derivatives is associated with price drops in the underlying 
securities, according to Sorescu (2000) and Danielsen and Sorescu  (2001).  
Markets for futures contracts on single equity stocks were first offered to U.S. 
investors in 2002. Selling a single stock future is equivalent to taking a short position 
in a company. Margin for single stock futures is set at 20 percent of the contract’s 
value, well above the 5 percent margin typical for other futures contracts. Johnson 
(2005) suggests that margin levels on single stock derivatives have been set by 
regulators in such a way as to balance attractiveness across markets. This in turn 
suggests an understanding by regulators that investors can treat each market as an 
alternative to the others.   
Contracts for differences, spread bets and swaps allow traders to hedge or 
speculate on price movements in securities without the need to purchase or sell-short 
those securities. Where an investor or speculator enters a contract for differences or a 
swap, or places a spread bet, the counterparty may choose to hedge his/ her exposure 
to the underlying security.  
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Investors thus have several alternative methods for placing trades that are 
economically equivalent to short-sales in the ‘cash market’. Regulatory restrictions 
on short-sales must thus be viewed in light of the possibility of finding alternative 
means of expressing a negative opinion about the value of a security.   
 
2.6 Issues for Regulators 
 
Financial regulators worldwide attempt to meet a variety of goals, including, 
amongst other things, the maintenance of confidence in financial markets, and the 
provision of the ‘correct’ degree of protection for consumers3. At times, regulators 
must balance conflicting priorities. For example, the evidence reviewed above 
suggests that markets in which short-selling is permitted should be more 
informationally efficient than those in which the practice is prohibited. However, 
unsuccessful short-sellers can face unlimited losses on their positions, although in 
practice, bankruptcy sets in at some point as losses rise. If confined to sophisticated 
investors, large losses and bankruptcy might be tolerable. However, amongst retail 
investors, especially those invested via collective investment funds, this might 
become politically unacceptable. Some regulators attempt to solve this dilemma by 
legally preventing those investors involved in collecting money from the public from 
short-selling securities. However, increasingly available alternatives, such as single 
stock futures, spread betting and contracts for differences, allow smaller (or ‘retail’) 
investors to short-sell securities. Robotti (2005) explores short-selling and arbitrage 
 
3 See, for example, the stated aims of the United Kingdom’s financial regulator, the Financial Services 
Authority, at www.fsa.gov.uk 
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in a regulatory context and argues: “The puzzle for regulators lies in this tension 
between the need to protect investors and the need to promote efficiency, which 
regulators find equally constraining.” The author argues that the efficiency argument 
has had an important influence on the way regulators allow short-selling to operate in 
a market. 
Deciding on the appropriate level of disclosure of information on short selling 
also presents a challenge to regulators. Publishing information on outstanding short 
positions improves transparency in markets, and should assist in making market 
more efficient, in the sense that information is readily available, disseminated widely 
and can be imputed into security prices. However, by disclosing such information, 
the risks associated with short-selling can increase. Amongst these is the risk of a 
short squeeze – a form of predatory trading. Predators can use knowledge about 
outstanding, specific short positions to initiate short squeezes. Fear of a short squeeze 
might deter short-selling amongst traders, and thus curtail the process of risk 
arbitrage. If short sellers stop driving prices towards fair value, the market becomes 
less efficient. This is a particularly difficult dilemma to resolve and regulators 
generally arrive at a compromise. For example, in the USA, aggregate short positions 
are disclosed to the market once a month for major stocks. In the UK, the aggregate 
securities on loan position for the largest 350 companies is disclosed daily, five days 
in arrears, to the market. Such disclosure provides a degree of transparency, but by 
using aggregated data, protects investors with limited capital from predatory trading.  
Robotti (2005) analyses responses to the SEC’s consultation process ahead of 
implementation of regulation SHO 2004, and shows that different institutions are 
affected by short selling regulation in different manners. For example, broker/ 
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dealers favoured less regulation, perhaps due to the fact that they derived income 
from the process of short-selling and wished to see it unconstrained. Stock exchanges, 
representing indirectly the corporate sector, favoured no change in regulation. 
Smaller capitalization companies favoured tighter regulation, perhaps fearing that 
short-selling could drive down their share prices and raise their cost of capital. Some 
smaller capitalization companies, and their shareholders, criticised short-sale abuses 
and alleged share price manipulation. Robotti (2005) argues that any initiative on 
short selling can affect the balance between the interests of long-shareholders 
(investors) and hedge funds/ market makers.  The author concludes: “The efficiency 
justification of short selling produces a divide [between corporate and financial 
interests, and also between long and short holders of capital].” Furthermore: 
“Contrary to the dominant view on short selling, no financial practice is positive or 
negative in absolute terms but only in relative terms. There are always social 
conflicts surrounding market practices.” 
 
 
3. Developing securities lending on mainland China 
 
The Bank for International Settlements (1999) asserts that “the ability to 
borrow securities is an indispensable element in the development of advanced, 
effective capital markets”. 4 The UK’s Stock Lending and Repo Committee 
comments that5: “Securities lending is a major and growing activity providing 
 
4 International Organization of Securities Commissions, July 1999 
5 Stock Lending and Repo Committee (SLRC), March 2004, an Introduction to Securities Lending 
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significant benefits for issuers, investors and traders alike. These are likely to include 
improved market liquidity, more efficient settlement, tighter dealer prices and 
perhaps a reduction in the cost of capital.”  
Various Chinese financial institutions are likely to benefit from securities 
lending. In particular, long-term investors, including social security funds, would be 
able to increase their income by lending securities to other parties with more 
immediate need for those securities. Additionally, the different tax positions for 
various investors in China create opportunities for borrowers to use tax arbitrage, in 
effect to exchange assets temporarily for the mutual benefit of both borrowers and 
lenders. Table 1 illustrates the tax rates that are applied to various types of investors 
for stock dividends and bond interest in China.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
 
Investors subject to higher rates of tax on dividend distributions are able to 
lend to those subject to lower rates. Tax savings are shared according to a formula 
agreed in advance between the two parties. Note that tax collection revenue is 
diminished as a consequence of this activity.  
In the USA, custodian banks that clear and hold positions for large 
institutional investors have become the main lending agents. In China, the Law of 
Securities Investment Fund, and the Law of Trust specify that all assets should be 
under the safeguard of trustees or custodians when asset owners transfer their assets 
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to asset managers for professional management. In China, the “big four6” banks, 
together with Bank of Communications, dominate the custody market with 
approximately 90% market share, allowing for economies of scale. The largest 
custodian bank, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), for example 
reported over $20 billion under custody on June 30th, 2005. Globally, custodians in 
the securities lending business compete on the basis of their collateral performance 
record, risk management track record, existing client base and technological 
capabilities. It is likely that the market share of Chinese custodian banks will 
ultimately be based on competitiveness in each of the above categories.  
 
 
4.  Policy suggestions for developing short-selling on mainland China 
 
4.1 The case for short-selling on mainland China 
 
The Bank for International Settlements’ Committee on the Global Financial 
System (1999) stated in its recommendations for creating efficient securities markets, 
“The ability to make short-sales is an important element of liquidity-enhancing 
trading rules. If short-sales are not allowed, dealers cannot respond to customers’ buy 
orders quickly. This impediment to the market-making function would cause a 
decline in market liquidity. Many countries adopt measures to facilitate short-sales, 
and special security lending and/or repo facilities through which the authorities can 
 
6 Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, China Construction Bank, Bank of China, Agriculture 
Bank of China. 
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provide the securities in short supply7”.  
Chinese investors are subjected to stringent short-sales constraints. Investors’ 
accounts are held centrally at the stock exchanges. Investors’ positions are checked 
by the exchanges prior to trade execution. A limited number of warrants and options 
on Chinese equities have been available on the Shanghai Stock Exchange since July 
18th, 2005, but the derivatives market remains immature8.  
 
A major cultural objection to short-selling is that it could be used to attempt 
to drive down share prices. China’s experience in the 21st century - a drop of 15.0% 
in the Shanghai Composite [Price] Index from 1/1/2000 to 12/31/2005 (source: 
Datastream) – is that restrictions on short-selling do not in themselves prevent a 
major stock market fall. If Miller’s 1977 proposition is taken at face value, short-
selling restrictions could lead to over-valuation of securities about which investors 
have divergent opinions. Any subsequent unwinding of these over-valuations could 
cause share prices to fall. 
Systematic risk is relatively high in emerging capital markets. Jin (2003) 
analyzes data from the Shanghai 180 Index in 2000, 2001 and the first half of 2002. 
The author finds that the ratio of systematic risk to the total risk is 36.04%, 44.44% 
and 70.77% respectively. Whereas non-systematic risk can be reduced through 
portfolio diversification, the hedging of systematic risk depends on short-selling, or 
the use of derivatives. 
 
7 “How Should We Design Deep and Liquid Markets? The Case of Government Securities,” Bank for 
International Settlements, Basel, Switzerland, 22 October 1999 
8 The government banned bond futures markets in 1995 because of a price manipulation scandal and 
has also put the development of equity derivatives markets on hold. 
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Li & Fleisher (2003) provide evidence for explaining the relatively low prices 
and high returns for B shares relative to their A share counterparts in the Chinese 
stock market. They assert that their evidence implies that the short-sales constraints 
are “binding” in the A-share market. In contrast, “dispersion of forecasters’ opinion 
is not significantly related to B-share returns”, hence short sales restrictions are not 
“binding” for trading in B shares. They conclude that “different influences of the 
short-sales restrictions at least partially explain the relatively low price of B shares”.  
Kang et al (2002) state that: “most individual investors [on China’s mainland 
exchanges] possess only rudimentary knowledge on stock investments and trade like 
noise traders”. Mei et al. (2005) analyse a data sample from 1993 to 2000, from the 
Chinese stock market, using perfectly segmented dual-class shares to test the 
implication of the presence of short-sales constraints and “heterogeneous beliefs” on 
asset prices and trading volume. They find several results consistent with the 
existence of a speculative component in the prices of domestic shares. “In many 
aspects, the price dynamics of the newly emerged Chinese market resembled the 
technology bubble in the U.S”. They argue that “investors’ speculative trading is an 
important determinant of stock prices during bubbles”. A speculative market would 
benefit from the ability to short-sell those stocks that appeared to be over-priced 
compared to fair value. Such a mechanism would assist in the efficient pricing of 
securities. 
The Chinese government has been making efforts to improve access to the 
stock market, including initiating the Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFII) 
programme, and lowering stamp duty. However, there are areas where government 
control may yet hinder market efficiency. For example, Baker and Wurgler (2002) 
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present evidence that US firms tend to issue equities when they perceive their market 
value to be higher than their intrinsic value. This acts as a market price correction 
mechanism. However, in China this mechanism is impaired because of government 
control over the timing of Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) and Seasoned Equity 
Offerings (SEOs). Specifically, government approval is required before Chinese 
companies can sell their equity. Strict quotas prevent some qualifying companies 
from taking advantage of favourable market conditions to issue their shares. In light 
of this constraint, we believe that the removal of short-selling prohibitions will have 
a beneficial impact on market efficiency.  
 
4.2 Experiences from Hong Kong and Taiwan 
 
In the past decade, the Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission 
(SFC)9 has made efforts to develop the short-selling and securities lending industry. 
Appendix 1 reviews the development history of short-selling in the Hong Kong 
market. Stock lending for settlement purposes took place informally among local 
brokers before 1986, but tax authorities imposed a tax on such transactions. From 
1989, a limited exemption to stamp duty was offered for securities borrowing of up 
to 14 days. Prior to 1994, there was little stock lending in Hong Kong. Demand was 
limited by legislative constraints, especially the Stock Exchange rules constraining 
short-selling and the restrictions imposed by the Stamp Duty Ordinance. In 1994, 
after the extension of the stamp duty exemption period from 14 days to 12 months, 
 
9 The Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) is an independent non-governmental statutory body 
outside the civil service, responsible for regulating the securities and futures markets in Hong Kong.  
 27
and the removal of legal and regulatory constraints on short selling, the securities 
lending market developed strongly. The 12-month exemption period restriction was 
lifted in 1999. 
A designated list of permitted stocks for short-selling is one means of control 
used by the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (SEHK). Chang & Yu (2004) analysed 
Hong Kong market data from January 1992 to July 2003 and noted that designated 
stocks are more likely to be value stocks, which are either constituents of indices or 
are relatively large and actively traded. The SFC has been considering a relaxation of 
the regulations relating to short-selling and derivatives activity. Relaxation measures 
are applicable when certain market neutral transactions have been introduced. The 
short-selling exemption is expected to enhance the liquidity of both the cash and 
futures markets.  
Taiwan began to legalise short selling on June 30, 2003. Stock borrowing 
costs have been high by global standards (typical costs have been reported by lending 
agents at about four times the level found in the USA), but growth in lending has 
been strong. Amongst capital markets, the Hong Kong and Taiwanese stock markets 
have many similarities with their counterparts in mainland China, including a 
relatively high ratio of share turnover to market capitalization, and high share price 
volatility. Their experiences may provide useful information for the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC).  
 
4.3 Introducing short-selling on exchange traded funds 
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Exchange-traded funds (ETFs) are a hybrid of closed-ended and open-ended 
securities. ETFs are listed on a stock exchange, and trade like stocks, but represent a 
basket of underlying securities in the same way as an index fund. The underlying 
securities are fungible with the ETF, by utilising a continuous in-specie redemption 
and issuance facility.  Over a number of years, ETFs have become successful risk 
management and hedging tools, largely due to the fact that they can be readily short-
sold. As an illustration, in 2002, the Australian Stock Exchange Ltd (ASX) 
introduced a liberalized short-selling regime for ETFs, similar to those prevailing at 
the time in Canada and the United States. ASX participants may short-sell an 
approved ETF without entering into a scrip-lending arrangement. The guidelines also 
allow short-selling parties to initiate trades free from the ‘up-tick’ rules, to gain 
immediate execution, even in falling markets. Daily short-selling reporting is 
required. 
ETF short positions are virtually invulnerable to ‘short squeezes’ and price 
manipulation, as the number of shares in an ETF in existence can be increased 
through use of the in-specie issuance facility. Arbitrage between ETF and underlying 
securities (and where available, index futures) can be readily undertaken by market 
makers and specialists. With the updating and reporting of the net asset value of the 
underlying portfolio throughout the trading day, arbitrage opportunities are readily 
detected, and this will improve market efficiency under normal circumstances. 
In Feb 2005, China Asset Management Co Ltd., launched the first ETF to 
track the SSE 50 Index in mainland China. As of June 30 2005, it remains the only 
ETF available in China. Fu’s (2005) research on the China SSE 50 ETF, based on 
turnover in 78 trading days from February 23, 2005 to June 17, 2005, finds that the 
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China SSE 50 ETF enjoyed 3.66 times more liquidity than a basket of index 
constituent stocks. The SSE 50 ETF enjoyed approximately 3.55% daily turnover 
ratio, i.e. 76% monthly turnover ratio, high by global standards. Fu (2005) analyses 
the arbitrage opportunities with SSE 50 ETFs and finds that the average premium 
over the underlying securities in the 78 trading days is 0.11%. In 23 out of 78 trading 
days, the absolute value of premium/discount was higher than 0.30% (breakeven 
point for offsetting costs), which provides a suitable spread for short selling.  
Benchmark index derivatives are widely used in risk management 
applications in developed capital markets. Since futures and forwards have not been 
legalised in the Chinese equity market, short-selling of ETFs is expected to be an 
ideal tool for risk management by holders of actively managed portfolios. Raab and 
Schwager’s (1993) observation that short positions in index futures allow investors to 
‘span’ the market, can be extended to include ETFs. By short-selling an ETF and 
taking long positions in all but one of the underlying securities in the ETF basket, 
one creates an effective short position in that single security. Thus, allowing short-
selling of ETFs is, in practical terms, equivalent to permitting short-selling of 
individual securities by those institutional investors able to undertake ‘program 
trades’. However, the risk of ‘short squeezes’ and price manipulation with ETFs is 
much diminished. Thus, permitting short-selling of ETFs is one means of introducing 
short-selling of individual stocks to institutional investors on the mainland Chinese 
markets, whilst minimizing  the risk of short-squeezes.  
An economically equivalent alternative to permitting short-selling of ETFs is 
to permit the launch of a so-called “inverse-ETF” – the performance of which is 
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inversely related to the performance of a traditional ETF. Buying an inverse ETF is 
thus equivalent to short-selling a traditional ETF.  
 
 
4.4  The Chinese second board market – an ideal laboratory  
 
In Hong Kong, the Growth Enterprises Market (GEM) is a stock market 
established to provide growth enterprises with a platform for raising capital to 
finance their businesses. Companies listed on a Second Board Market might 
generally be expected to be smaller and less mature than those listed on a Main 
Board, with less liquid and more volatile share prices. The Chinese securities 
authorities have put the establishment of Second Board Market on the agenda for 
development. Determining how to hedge risks is a concern in developing the Second 
Board Market in China.  
By permitting short-selling in a Second Board Market, one might expect 
improved price discovery and liquidity. Short-selling has the effect of increasing the 
total supply of assets available to support trading and settlement, boosting trading 
volumes and facilitating arbitrage strategies. Market makers in the Second Board 
Market are responsible for providing bid and ask prices for investors to guarantee 
market liquidity. With short-sale constraints, market makers would generally hold 
larger inventories of shares than without such constraints. The greater financing costs 
associated with larger inventories are likely to be passed on to market participants, in 
the former of larger bid-ask spreads. Thus, there would be benefits from permitting 
short-selling on a Second Board exchange, if such a market were to be established. 
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However, as highlighted in Robotti (2005), the directors of smaller companies can 
become concerned at the risk of price manipulation in their shares, and thus anti-
abuse measures would need to be initiated in tandem with short-sale liberalization. 
  
4.5  Measures to prevent potential short-selling abuse  
 
Protection against abusive short selling is important for both issuer and 
investor confidence. Manipulation is the “intentional interference with the free forces 
of supply and demand.”10 Finnerty (2005) points out that market manipulation can be 
profitable when there is a difference between the price elasticity of purchases and 
sales, which the manipulator can exploit. Finnerty highlights a variety of devices 
used by stock market manipulators, including the release of false information about a 
company and employing trading strategies that impede the price formation process, 
such as ‘naked shorting’, ‘wash sales’, ‘matched trades’, and ‘painting the tape’, all 
of which inject misleading trading information into the market, to move market 
prices in a direction that benefits the manipulator. The US SEC adopted Regulation 
SHO in 2004 to curb naked short selling (SEC, 2003b, 2004), ostensibly to reduce 
abusive or manipulative trading. Likewise, naked short selling in China, should be 
expressly prohibited. Finnerty also claims: “It is certainly possible, of course, that the 
manipulator is also an insider”. Allen & Gale (1992) point out stock-price 
manipulation was an important phenomenon in US stock markets until the 1930s. 
Concern about the harmful effects of manipulation led to the advent of the Securities 
 
10 Pagel, Inc. v. SEC, 803 F 2d, 942, 946 (8th Circuit, 1986). 
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Exchange Act of 1934 which prohibits the practices that facilitate manipulation, such 
as short-selling by managers and the announcement of false information.  
Zhang & Ji (2003) obtained data from 108 companies listed on the Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange and found that Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) rose 
significantly before the release of positive information (including the declaration of 
high dividends, declaration of M&A of the target companies and announcement of 
EPS above consensus analysts’ forecasts). After release, CAR was negative. They 
conclude that insider trading is rife in the Chinese stock market. With short-selling, 
insiders are also able to profit by exploiting both their information advantage and the 
liquidity traders’ timing disadvantage. Strict enforcement of insider trading rules, 
prohibition on insiders from short-selling and the requirement to disclose aggregate 
short-positions are all likely to be needed at the same time as constraints on short-
selling are lifted.  
 
4.6  Introduction of an up-tick rule 
 
The stated objectives of the Up-tick Rule11 is to allow relatively unrestricted 
short selling when the firm’s stock is advancing; to prevent short-selling of the firm’s 
stock at successively lower prices; and to prevent short-sellers from accelerating a 
declining market in a firm’s stock by exhausting all remaining bids at one price level, 
thereby causing successively lower prices to be established by long sellers.  
Regulators’ opinions differ as to whether such a rule is necessary. The organised 
exchanges in the USA and the Toronto Stock Exchange make use of an up-tick rule, 
whereas the London Stock Exchange does not. Alexander & Peterson (1999) conduct 
 
11 Securities Act Release No. 16964, July 9, 1980. 
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a study using a representative sample of stocks listed on the NYSE during May 1996, 
and conclude that the Up-tick Rule “hinders price discovery in both advancing and 
declining markets.” They suggest that regulators could use alternatives to the Up-tick 
rule, for instance, prohibiting short-selling in a given stock on a given trading day 
after it has fallen in price by a stated percentage during that day. In Taiwan, the 
TSEC’s Clearing Department has, in addition to an Up-tick rule, introduced a plan 
(not yet fully implemented at the time of writing) to set ceilings for short-selling. The 
plan recommends “(1) Daily maximum short-selling of borrowed stock cannot 
exceed 3% of outstanding shares per lending stocks. (2) Maximum short-selling of 
borrowed stock cannot exceed 10% of outstanding shares per lending stock. (3) The 
total volume of short-selling of borrowed stock and short-selling by margin 
transactions cannot exceed 25% of outstanding shares per stock.” Although the 
evidence on market efficiency and price discovery does not support the introduction 
of an up-tick rule, China might initially benefit from an Up-tick rule, and possibly 
further restrictions on short-selling, such as those used in Taiwan’s equity market, so 
as to build confidence that short-selling does not lead to downward price spirals. As 
the market matures, this rule can be reviewed in light of the prevailing evidence.  
 
4.7  Short-selling transparency 
 
At present, SEHK collects and report daily short positions for all qualified 
securities by issue and by the total relative turnover on a daily basis. The TSEC 
monitors the 3% of daily shares limit for short-selling and discloses the remaining 
shares available to short to securities firms via the computerized trading system. 
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Investors may enquire on-line about the availability of shares for short-selling during 
the trading session from securities firms.  
The frequency of disclosure of data for short-selling is one proxy for market 
transparency. Gelos & Wei (2003) report on an IMF examination of 639 funds 
managing approximately US$120 billion from January 1996–December 2000. Most 
funds had a focus on emerging markets. They find that international funds invest 
greater assets in more transparent markets, and during a financial crisis, international 
investors tend to exit from more opaque markets first. Their discovery is consistent 
with Ausubel (1990), who suggests that “outsiders” will reduce their investment if 
they expect “insiders” to take advantage of informational asymmetry.   
Increased transparency and publicly available information on securities 
lending and short-sale positions has a role to play in reducing both informational 
asymmetry and opportunities for illegal insider trading in mainland China. An 
appropriate level of transparency would be one that is sufficient to build confidence 
in the market from both domestic and foreign investors, but not so much as to deter 
arbitrageurs from their activities. There appears to be no current consensus amongst 
regulators as to what this level of disclosure might be.  
 
4.8  Liberalizing credit trading to facilitate short-selling 
 
The Chinese legal authorities have recently been discussing amendments to 
the “Securities Law”. The current practice of prohibiting credit trade is an area of 
contention. In 2004, the ‘Nine Opinions of the State Council’ were reiterated, 
seeking to develop the capital markets through financial innovation.  
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The development of short-selling depends on a reliable and comprehensive 
credit trading regime. The securities finance industry aims to assist investors in their 
activities through margin loans, securities lending and by providing channels for cash 
discounts. According to TSEC (2001), there are three main credit trading regimes in 
existence worldwide: American style (scattered credit authorization), Japanese/ 
Korean style (centralized credit authorization) and Taiwanese style (parallel and 
specialized credit authorization). In Taiwan, the main credit trade business is 
currently carried out by intermediaries known as securities finance companies, which 
provide margin loans, securities loans and refinancing services to securities firms. 
Although higher cost than other regimes, risk control is enhanced, and this has value 
for emerging capital markets. Compared to Japan, the Taiwanese regime is not 
“institution to institution”, but extends to all investors, and is thus more liberalized. 
But TSEC (2001) also point out that the Taiwanese regime might cause more clients 
to default on credit, thus increasing settlement risk.  
We propose two stages of credit trading development for mainland China, to 
combine the advantages of the Japanese and Taiwanese regimes. First, using 
specialized securities finance companies; and second, allowing liberalized securities 
financing.  
In the specialized securities finance companies system, stock exchanges are 
responsible for designating stocks available for short-selling, and specifying the 
requirements for shortable shares. Investors with credit accounts at securities 
companies can apply to securities firms for short-selling. Securities firms examine 
investors’ cash account and credit status, and can proceed with the investors’ 
application by applying to a securities finance company. The securities finance 
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company determines the number of shares available for lending, required collateral 
and margin ratio. The securities firm then provides margin to the securities finance 
company. Once the securities finance company approves securities lending, it 
informs the transfer agent. The securities exchange transfers the proceeds from the 
short-sale as collateral to an account at the securities finance company.  In this 
regime, securities finance companies act as a central party for securities transfers and 
cash flows and bridge the securities lending business with stock exchanges, securities 
firms, funds and other financial institutions. Only licensed securities firms can 
provide securities financing for credit trade clients, and securities finance companies 
cannot provide credit to the clients directly.  This regime is simple for regulators to 
administer, and suited to emerging capital markets.  
With greater development of derivatives and capital markets, the role of 
securities finance companies will become less critical, and a more open, liberalized 
securities financing system becomes appropriate. The transition to a liberalized 
securities finance market can take the form of full competition, whereby securities 
firms can apply for securities lending to the market directly, or via a Korean-style 
regime, whereby securities finance companies act as warrantors, and collateral is 
under the custody of securities finance companies. In Korea, for example, the Korean 
Securities Deposit Company (KSD) works as the intermediary to provide securities 
financing and securities safekeeping services.   
 
 
5. Summary and conclusions 
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Theoretical considerations suggest that, when investors’ opinions diverge, 
short-sale constraints can lead to over-pricing of securities. In empirical studies 
across markets, Bris et al. (2003) find evidence consistent with the notion that price 
discovery at the individual stock level is more efficient when short-selling is feasible. 
Charoenrook and Daouk (2004) find evidence that short-sale constraints reduce 
market quality. 
By allowing market makers to borrow securities temporarily, market makers 
can hold smaller inventories of shares and this leads to tighter bid-ask spreads and 
lower trading costs. When market makers can borrow stock, this also lowers the 
potential for failed settlement. Securities lending permits investors to earn 
incremental income by lending out idle securities held in custody. It also facilitates 
investment strategies such as arbitrage that would not be possible without a liquid 
supply of securities available for borrowing. Regulators are aware of the benefits to 
price discovery and market efficiency that can ensue when securities lending and 
short-selling are permitted. They are also cognizant of the need to create 
transparency in a market, but recognize that full disclosure of short positions can 
raise the risks of predatory trading against short-sellers. However, as revealed during 
public consultation prior to the introduction of Regulation SHO (2004) in the USA, 
not all interested parties are in favor of liberalized short-selling. As Robotti (2005) 
argues: “There are always social conflicts surrounding market practices.” 
Liberalization of short-selling presents a new challenge for Chinese securities 
regulators. We show that several types of institution would benefit if securities 
lending and short-selling were permitted in mainland China. Practices in other 
countries, and the incremental development of short-selling in the Hong Kong and 
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Taiwanese capital markets may provide valuable information for Chinese market 
regulators. In light of the evidence available, we believe that a phased introduction of 
securities lending and short-selling would be beneficial to the development of the 
Chinese capital markets. The infrastructure for credit trading forms the basis for the 
development of securities lending and short-selling. A specialized securities finance 
companies system, combining the advantages of the current Japanese and Taiwanese 
regimes could be considered first by the Chinese authorities. On development of this 
infrastructure, we propose that short-selling of exchange traded funds be permitted 
initially. This would facilitate the short-selling of individual stocks by institutional 
investors, whilst minimizing the risk of short-squeezes.  
    Next, on the launch of a Second Board Market, short-selling should be 
permitted from the outset. Beyond this, short-selling on the Main Board, initially for 
a designated range of shares only, should be permitted. Enforcement of insider 
trading regulations, a prohibition on naked-short positions, the initial introduction of 
an up-tick rule, and appropriate levels of disclosure should all accompany this 
liberalization. These will serve to minimise market abuse and build market integrity. 
Regulators in any country must balance the interests of the various market 
stakeholders, but an over-arching goal should be to create a transparent and efficient 
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Appendix 3.  Review of the Development History of Short-Selling in the Hong 
Kong Market.  
 
Before January 3, 1994 Prohibited 
 
January 3, 1994 The Hong Kong Stock Exchange (SEHK) allowed 17 out of the 33 
constituent stocks of the Hang Seng Index (HSI) to be sold short subject to 
several restrictions. A typical restriction is called the Up-tick Rule. SEHK 
relaxed the stamp duty on securities lending transactions and abolished 
reporting requirements to reduce the administrative expenses of the 
shorts/borrower.  
 
March 25, 1996 Market development was attributed to three initiatives: (1) Expanding the 
availability of the designated list of stocks. The number of securities 
designated for short selling was increased. In total, 113 firms listed on the 
exchange, including all constituent stocks of HSI, were allowed to be sold 
short; (2) Up-tick rule was lifted; (3) A rationalisation of margin 
requirements.  
 
September 7, 1998 After the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997/98, the government increased the 
penalty for misconduct on naked short selling and mandated settlements on 
(T+2). To enforce the rules, the Clearing House (SCC) announced it would 
impose compulsory stock lending and borrowing arrangements for delivery 
default on T+2, then close out all T+3 fails with buy-ins, regardless of fees 
and heavy penalties. SCC may consider suspension of membership for 
repeat offenders. Brokerage firms were told to be ready, upon SEHK’s 
request, to report the names of their beneficiary clients and would be held 
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responsible for “ascertaining that clients have the covering stocks for sales 
orders and, in the case of short sales, have appropriate arrangements in 
hand, and to report them to the stock exchange.” In parallel, SEHK re-
introduced the Up-tick rule for covered short selling. However short-selling 
transactions by stock options market makers for hedging the risk of the 
portfolio are exempt from the Up-tick rule. 
 
December 3, 2001 The Up-tick rule on short-selling in the stock market for index arbitrageurs 
and market makers was repealed to help improve market liquidity, 
especially in a depressed market. The number of designated securities for 
short selling is revised on a quarterly basis according to their liquidity and 
market capitalisation.  
 
January 27, 2003 163 out of 812 common stocks traded on the main board were on the 
shortable list.   
 
Source: SEHK, Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited, International 
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Table 1  Tax Rates by Investor Segment in China  
 Tax Rate Applied 
Investors Segmentation Stock   Treasury Bond   Corporate Bond 
Mutual Fund 20% 0 20% 
Insurance Co 33% 0 33% 
Securities Co 33% 0 33% 
Social Securities Fund 0 0 0 
Corporate Annuity  0 0 0 
Trust 0 0 0 
Normal Corporate  33% 0 33% 
Normal Individual Investors 20% 0 20% 
QFII 0 0 0 
Source: Asset Custody Department, Bank of Communications 
 
 
 
